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  Executive Summary
  The broader issue dealt with in the paper is to what 
extent multi-party development efforts are accountable to their 
intended beneficiaries. One mechanism for ensuring accounta-
bility is human rights. Traditionally, only States carried human 
rights obligations. International law has evolved, however, and 
now recognises that intergovernmental organisations, including 
the international financial institutions, are also bound by human 
rights law.
The World Bank has responded to some extent to this 
shift by creating the Inspection Panel. Beneficiaries can use the 
Inspection Panel to query compliance by the Bank with its own 
operational policies, some of which reflect human rights con-
cerns.4 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2002-07 IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2002-07 • 5
  Résumé
  La vaste question traitée dans cet article est celle de 
voir dans quelle mesure les multiples acteurs qui sont impliqués 
dans les efforts de développement rendent compte de leurs ac-
tions aux bénéficiaires.
Les droits humains peuvent être un instrument utile pour 
garantir la responsabilisation des acteurs du développement. Tra-
ditionnellement, seuls les Etats étaient tenus aux obligations du 
droit international. Mais, le droit international a évolué; celui-
ci reconnaît aujourd’hui que les organisations internationales, 
y compris les institutions financières internationales, sont aussi 
soumises à la législation sur les droits humains. 
La Banque Mondiale a tenu compte de cette évolution en 
créant le Panel d’Inspection. Les bénéficiaires peuvent utiliser ce 
Panel d’Inspection en vue de respecter les politiques d’opération 
de  la  Banque  dont  certaines  reflètent  les  préoccupations  des 
droits humains. 6 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2002-07 IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2002-07 • 7
  Introduction
  Human rights obligations of the international finan-
cial institutions (IFIs) may flow from different sources.  They 
may originate in norms that are external to the organisations. 
They may also result from treaties entered into by the organisa-
tions, or from internal rules that bind staff.  
Even if the existence of human rights obligations for in-
ternational financial institutions can be established, it remains to 
be seen whether the IFIs can be held accountable in case of non-
compliance. The International Court of Justice does not have ju-
risdiction to deal with cases brought against the IFIs. Domestic 
courts face jurisdictional immunity. The World Bank has, on the 
other hand, established an accountability mechanism: the World 
Bank Inspection Panel. Requests brought before the Inspection 
Panel offer valuable insights on World Bank impact on human 
rights. 
1.  The law
  The international financial institutions3 are inter-
governmental organisations. They are subjects of international 
law, and thus capable of possessing rights and duties under inter-
national law. The extent of these rights and duties depends on the 
purposes and functions as specified or implied in the constituent 
documents of the organisations and developed in practice4.
In its advisory opinion on Interpretation of the agreement 
of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt, the Internation-
al Court of Justice clarified that as subjects of international law, 
international organisations are bound by:
Any obligation incumbent upon them under general rules of 
international  law,  under  their  constitutions  or  under  international 
agreements to which they are parties5.
The legal question thus is whether any of these sources 
contain human rights obligations incumbent upon the interna-
tional financial institutions.
 
3  The international financial institutions include IFAD, 
the  International  Fund  for  Agricultural  Development, 
which  mobilises  financial  resources  to  raise  food  pro-
duction and nutrition levels among the poor in develop-
ing countries, the IMF, the International Monetary Fund, 
and the World Bank group consisting of the IBRD, Inter-
national  Bank  for  reconstruction  and  development,  the 
IFC, the International Finance Corporation, which assists 
developing countries through investing in private sector 
projects,  the  IDA,  International  Development  Associa-
tion, which provides loans on concessional terms to poor-
er developing countries that may not be eligible for loans 
from the IBRD, ICSID, the International Centre for the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes and MIGA, the Multi-
lateral Investment Guarantee Agency. 
4  International Court of Justice, Reparation for injuries 
suffered in the service of the United Nations, Advisory 
opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1949, 179-180.
5  International  Court  of  Justice,  Interpretation  of  the 
Agreement  of  25  March  1951  between  the  WHO  and 
Egypt. Advisory opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1980, 89-90.8 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2002-07 IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2002-07 • 9
1.1.  Human rights obligations under general rules
  of international law
  The international financial institutions are inter-
governmental  organisations  enjoying  international  legal  per-
sonality6. 
Intergovernmental organisations are subject to the reach 
of general rules of international law, i.e. custom and general 
principles of law7. Although the establishment of the existence 
of both customary rules and general principles of law relies on 
State practice and State legislation, it is generally accepted that 
their scope is not limited to States. If it were, States would be 
able to evade their international obligations by creating interna-
tional organisations acting with impunity. In addition, treaty-
based intergovernmental organisations, such as the IFIs, origi-
nate in international law, and it therefore follows that the general 
rules of that system of law apply.
Consequently, the international financial institutions are 
subject to the reach of international human rights law, in so far 
as human rights law is incorporated in international custom or 
in general principles of law8. There is no doubt that elements of 
human rights law have obtained the status of custom and of gen-
eral principles of law9.
In order to determine the exact substance and scope of 
the obligations of general human rights law as applicable to the 
international financial institutions, the legal capacities of the or-
ganisations need to be taken into account. These capacities are 
defined by the powers and functions entrusted to the organisa-
tions. Intergovernmental organisations are prohibited from act-
ing ultra vires: they are not allowed to perform acts beyond their 
powers.
Consequently, the degree to which the international fi-
nancial institutions are bound by affirmative duties to act10 to-
wards the realisation of general rules of human rights needs to 
be determined in the light of the constituent documents and sub-
sequent practice of the organisations. The World Bank and the 
IMF can only be required to engage in activities for the reali-
sation of human rights to the extent allowed by their respective 
purposes and functions. As argued below, the application of this 
test leads to a different result for the World Bank and the IMF.
6  The constituent documents of the IFIs provide that that 
the institutions have ‘full juridical personality’ ‘including 
i.a. the capacity to contract and to institute legal proceed-
ings (Article VII, section 2, IBRD Articles of Agreement 
(27 December 1944), Article IX, section 2, IMF Articles 
of Agreement (22 July 1944)).  The provisions do not ex-
plicitly state that the IFIs enjoy international legal person-
ality, but there is no doubt that the organisations meet the 
requirements set by the International Court of Justice in 
Reparation for injuries. Compare Skogly, S. (2001), The 
human rights obligations of the World Bank and the Inter-
national Monetary Fund. London: Cavendish, 64-71.
7  Compare Amerasinghe, C.F. (1996), Principles of the in-
stitutional law of international organizations. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 240: “... there can be no doubt 
that under customary international law (...), international 
organizations can also have international obligations to-
wards other international persons arising from the partic-
ular circumstances in which they are placed or from par-
ticular relationships”. See also Skogly, S. (2001), 113: “ ... 
obligations based on customary law and general principles 
of international law apply to all actors in the international 
community”.
8  Compare the Committee on accountability of interna-
tional organisations of the International Law Association: 
“ As part of the process of the humanisation of internation-
al law, human rights guarantees are increasingly becoming 
an expression of the common constitutional traditions of 
States and can become binding upon international organi-
sations as general principles of law.  The consistent practice 
of the UN General Assembly and of the Security Council 
points to the emergence of a customary rule to this effect”. 
ILA Committee on accountability of international organi-
sations, Third report presented to the New Delhi Confer-
ence (2002), part two, section three (available from the ILA 
website).
9  For a detailed study, see Meron, T. (1989), Human rights 
and humanitarian norms in customary law. Oxford: Claren-
don.
10 Language borrowed from Handl, G. (1998), “The legal 
mandate of multilateral development banks as agents for 
change toward sustainable development”, American jour-
nal of international law. Vol. 92, 662.8 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2002-07 IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2002-07 • 9
On the other hand, the international financial institutions 
are under a duty to respect the prohibitive general rules of hu-
man rights law. They are thus under an obligation not to violate 
or to become complicit in the violation of general rules of hu-
man rights law by actions or omissions attributable to them11.   
This obligation results from the starting point that the powers 
and functions of intergovernmental organisations should not be 
interpreted in such a way as to permit actions by these organi-
sations that are contrary to prohibitive general rules of interna-
tional law.
It is difficult, however, to determine the exact content of 
the general rules of human rights law. The International Court 
of Justice has not ruled on whether the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights constitutes customary international law12. Lists 
of rights that have achieved this status have been put forward, 
both in legislation and in legal writings, usually accompanied by 
the proviso that the lists need to be open-ended in order to allow 
taking into account new developments. Skogly makes an appeal-
ing argument in favour of an approach suggesting that aspects of 
most civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights have at-
tained the status of general rules13. 
A clear disadvantage of having to rely on custom and gen-
eral principles is that it opens up the space for challenges to the 
status of the rule, if only because there is no standing mechanism 
with the authority to review and determine whether specific hu-
man rights obligations have achieved the necessary status or not.   
Consequently, the importance of recognition by the internation-
al financial institutions themselves that they have a legal respon-
sibility for human rights, either on the basis of self-regulation or 
as a consequence of treaties entered into should not be underes-
timated.
1.2.  Human rights obligations under IFI constitu- 
    tions and other internal instruments
1.2.1. Articles of Agreement
  There are no references to human rights in the con-
stituent documents of the international financial institutions.
Article 1 of the IBRD Articles of Agreement sets out the 
World Bank’s purposes. These include assistance to the recon-
struction and development of the territories of its members, i.a. 
by “encouraging international investment for the development of 
11  Compare Tomuschat: “ Nobody doubts, for instance, 
that international organizations are committed to abide by 
universally or regionally applicable human rights stand-
ards”.  See Tomuschat, C. (2001), “International law: en-
suring the survival of mankind on the eve of a new cen-
tury. General course on public international law”, Receuil 
des cours. Vol. 281, 138; even more specifically: “It has 
been suggested, for example, that the World Bank is not 
subject to general international norms for the protection 
of human rights. In our view, that conclusion is without 
merit, on legal or policy grounds (...). See Sands, P., Klein, 
P. (2001), Bowett’s Law of international institutions. Lon-
don: Sweet & Maxwell, 459.
12 In United States diplomatic and consular staff in Tehe-
ran the International Court of Justice held that “wrong-
fully to deprive human beings of their freedom and sub-
ject them to physical constraint in conditions of hardship 
is  manifestly  incompatible  with  the  principles  of  the 
Charter of the United Nations, as well as with the fun-
damental principles enunciated in the Universal Decla-
ration of Human Rights”, and constitutes a violation of 
international  law  (International  Court  of  Justice,  Unit-
ed States diplomatic and consular staff in Teheran (Unit-
ed States v. Iran)), ICJ Reports 1980, 43).  In Barcelona 
Traction, Light and Power Company, the ICJ held that all 
States have a legal interest in protecting certain rights: the 
Court  explicitly  mentions  genocide  and  “the  principles 
and rules concerning the basic rights of the human per-
son, including protection from slavery and racial discrim-
ination” (International Court of Justice, Barcelona Trac-
tion, Light and Power Company (Belgium v. Spain), ICJ 
Reports, 1970, par. 33-34. In East Timor the Court con-
firmed that the right of peoples to self-determination had 
an erga omnes character (International Court of Justice, 
Case concerning East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), ICJ 
Reports, 1995, 102). Note that this right includes a prohi-
bition to deprive a people of its own means of subsistence.   
This prohibition is sometimes invoked by those allegedly 
adversely affected by IFI interventions.
13 See Skogky, S. (2001), 120-123.  On the Universal Dec-
laration of Human Rights as customary law, see also De 
Feyter, K. (2001), World development law. Antwerp: In-
tersentia, 246-248.10 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2002-07 IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2002-07 • 11
the productive resources of members, thereby assisting in rais-
ing productivity, the standard of living and conditions of labour 
in their territories”14.
The World Bank group provides finance for the devel-
opmental needs of borrowing countries. Clearly, development 
extends beyond the macroeconomic realm, and includes envi-
ronmental, social, human and institutional components.  The 
Bank’s current approach to development, as evidenced by its 
comprehensive development framework15, is to achieve the in-
terdependence of all elements of development - “social, struc-
tural, human, governance, environmental, macroeconomic, and 
financial”16. 
The multi-dimensional approach to development equal-
ly includes the protection and promotion of human rights, as 
evidenced by the UN Agendas for development17, successive 
UNDP Human development reports18, and the UN Declaration 
on the right to development19.  The Bank does not disagree. In 
a paper published on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Bank acknowl-
edged that “creating the conditions for the attainment of human 
rights is a central and irreducible goal of development”; that   
“the world now accepts that sustainable development is impos-
sible without human rights”, and that “the Bank contributes di-
rectly to the fulfilment of many rights articulated in the Univer-
sal Declaration” etc20.
If it is agreed that the Articles of Agreement need to be 
interpreted in the light of the current concept of development, 
then clearly the mandate of the Bank extends to financing for 
the promotion and protection of human rights.  There is nothing 
in the definition of the purposes of the Bank precluding the ap-
plication of affirmative duties to act towards the realisation of 
general rules of human rights.  Both from a legal and a policy 
perspective, the multidimensional approach to development (as 
endorsed by the Bank) requires that the human rights dimension 
to Bank fields of activity such as poverty reduction, health serv-
ices or education is taken into account21.
Those  resisting  any  consideration  of  human  rights  in 
World Bank activities sought refuge in Article IV, 10 of the 
IBRD Articles of Agreement:
The Bank and its officers shall not interfere in the political af-
fairs of any member; nor shall they be influenced in their decisions by 
the political character of the member or members concerned.  Only 
14  Article I, par. i, IBRD Articles of Agreement (27 Decem-
ber 1944).
15 Compare Wolfensohn, J. (1999), A proposal for a com-
prehensive development framework, 1999, available from 
the World Bank group website (www.worldbank.org/cdf).
16  The Bank’s Operational Directive on Poverty (discussed 
infra, section 2,A,a) explains that the Bank’s approach to 
poverty reduction has evolved over time: “Cumulatively, 
this evolution increased recognition that economic growth 
alone is not a sufficient objective of development - or ade-
quate measure of success - and that investments in human 
resources contribute to increasing incomes and reducing 
poverty” (see OD 4.15 on Poverty Reduction (December 
1991), par. 2). Compare also Boisson de Chazournes, L., 
“Issues  of  social  development:  Integrating  human  rights 
into  the  activities  of  the  World  Bank”  in  Institut  Inter-
national des Droits de l’Homme (ed.) (2001), Commerce 
mondial et protection des droits de l’homme, Bruxelles: 
Bruylant, 54-64.
17  An agenda for development. Report by the Secretary-
General. UN doc. A/48/935 (6 May 1994), and the subse-
quent report adopted by the UN General Assembly, UN 
doc. A/51/45 (16 June 1997).  The latter report perceives of 
respect for human rights as one of the indispensable foun-
dations of development (par. 27).
18  The UNDP Human development reports have contribut-
ed significantly to the integration of human rights into de-
velopment.  See in particular UNDP Human development 
report 2000, Oxford: Oxford University Press, where hu-
man rights appear as the central theme.
19 UN Declaration on the right to development, UN GA res-
olution 41/128 (4 December 1986).  According to the Dec-
laration, States should “eliminate obstacles to development 
resulting from failure to observe civil and political rights, 
as well as economic, social and cultural rights” (Art. 6, par. 
3). Note that Article 1 of the Agreement establishing the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development  (29 
May 1990) defines the purpose of the Bank as “to foster the 
transition towards open market-oriented economies and to 
promote private and entrepreneurial initiative in the central 
and eastern European countries committed to and applying 
the principles of multiparty democracy, pluralism and mar-
ket economics”.  
20 Gaeta, A., Vasilara, M.(1998), Development and human 
rights: the role of the World Bank, Washington: the World 
Bank, 2-3. Compare also Sfeir-Younis, A., Economic, so-
cial  and  cultural  rights  and  development  strategies:  hu-
man rights economics in international relations. UN doc. 
E/C.12/2001/8 (15 March 2001), 4, where the World Bank 
Special Representative to the UN asserts that the World 
Bank has a major history of assisting countries in the im-
plementation of economic, social and cultural rights.
21 Handl convincingly argues with respect to sustainable 
development, that as the development banks expand their 
functions to include a wide array of activities, they must 
also  be  deemed  subject  to  a  commensurately  expanded 
reach of general or customary international law.  See Han-
dl, G. (1998), 657.  On the other hand, the author does rec-
ognise that the development banks are subject only to func-
tionally limited obligations regarding the enhancement of 
human rights (Handl, G. (1998), 663).10 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2002-07 IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2002-07 • 11
economic  considerations  shall  be  weighed  impartially  in  order  to 
achieve the purposes stated in Article I.
The former General Legal Counsel of the World Bank, Ib-
rahim Shihata22, clarified, however, that the scope of Article IV, 
10 was limited. The provision does not bar the Bank from financ-
ing human rights related projects, nor does it suggest that the 
Bank should enjoy impunity when it becomes involved in human 
rights violations. The issue addressed by Article IV, 10 is human 
rights conditionality strictu sensu: the Bank should not refuse 
assistance, because of prevailing violations of human rights23 in 
the Borrower’s country.  In Shihata’s view, even this prohibition 
is not absolute:
 
(...)  Political  situations,  which  have  effects  on  the  country’s 
economy or on the feasibility of project implementation or monitoring   
(...) should (...) be taken into account. Human rights may, under this 
opinion, become a relevant issue if their violation becomes so perva-
sive as to raise concerns relating to the matters mentioned above24.
The Bank’s current position on conditionality is that it is 
barred from exercising human rights conditionality, except as a 
consequence of UN Security Council action25, or unless the eco-
nomic consequences of human rights violations are so pervasive 
that the project under consideration is not feasible. This is a re-
spectable position, given the variety of views on conditionality. 
Economic sanctions are often counterproductive from a human 
rights perspective. The trend is towards targeting individuals at 
fault, rather than societies26. In the exceptional cases where sanc-
tions may be useful, current Bank policy allows sufficient lati-
tude.  
The Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary 
Fund do not refer to human rights. The purposes of the IMF, as 
defined27, do not even refer to development. They do not differ-
entiate between countries on the basis of level of development 
reached.  The  IMF  traditionally  portrays  itself  as  a  monetary 
agency, not as a development agency28.
Article I of the IMF Articles of Agreement does refer to 
the promotion and maintenance of high levels of employment and 
real income and to the development of the productive resources 
of the members, and the notion that the correction of maladjust-
ment in the members’ balance of payments should not include 
“measures  destructive  of  national  and  international  prosperi-
ty”29. In 1978, a reference to the effect of IMF measures on social 
policies was included in the Articles in a section dealing with 
22  See Shihata, I. (1991), The World Bank in a changing 
world. Dordrecht: M.Nijhoff, 97-134.
23  On the disagreements in the 1960s and 1970s between 
the UN General Assembly and the World Bank on support 
to South Africa and Portugal, see Marmorstein, V. (1978),   
“World Bank power to consider human rights factors in 
loan decisions”, Journal of international law and econom-
ics, 113-136.
24 See Shihata, I. (1991), 107.
25 Under  the  UN-IBRD  Relationship  Agreement,  the 
Bank is required to take note of the obligations of its mem-
bers “to carry out the decisions of the UN Security Coun-
cil”, and has undertaken “to have due regard for the deci-
sions of the Security Council under Articles 41 and 42 of 
the UN Charter” (See Article VI, par. 1, Agreement be-
tween the UN and the IBRD (1947). The Bank is thus un-
der an obligation, via the obligation resting on its mem-
bers, to respect an economic embargo imposed by the UN 
Security Council in the context of the maintenance of in-
ternational peace and security. Starting from the 1990s, 
the UN Security Council has given increasing weight to 
widespread and systematic violations of civil and politi-
cal rights in arriving at the determination that a threat to 
international peace and security existed, and thus as a ba-
sis for the taking of economic and military sanctions. See 
also infra, under section A, 3, a.
26 Compare Garfield, R. (1999), The impact of econom-
ic sanctions on health and well being, London: Relief and 
Rehabilitation Network. 
27  Articles  of  Agreement  International  Monetary  Fund 
(22 July 1944).
28  See Williams, M. (1994), International economic or-
ganisations and the third world, Hertfordshire: Harvest-
er Wheatsheaf, 55.
29  Art. I, par ii and v respectively. The IMF General Coun-
sel, François Gianviti, states that under the latter provi-
sion, the IMF “has taken the view that its conditionality 
could include the removal of exchange and trade restric-
tions, but also the avoidance of measures that may be dam-
aging to the environment or to the welfare of the popu-
lation”.  See Gianviti, F., Economic, social and cultural 
rights and the International Monetary Fund, UN doc. E/
C.12/2001/WP.5 (7 May 2001), par. 50.12 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2002-07 IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2002-07 • 13
the Fund’s overseeing of the compliance of its members with 
the purposes set out in Article I. While exercising surveillance 
over the exchange rate policies of its members, the Fund was to 
respect “the domestic social and political policies of members”, 
and “to pay due regard to the circumstances of members”30.  
Today, it is debatable whether the IMF still is a pure-
ly monetary agency31. In the 1980s, the IMF became involved 
with long-term assistance, and thus with development, as a con-
sequence of its role in debt rescheduling. More recently, in re-
sponse to mounting criticism of the IFIs, the Executive Boards 
of the World Bank and the IMF jointly endorsed the comprehen-
sive development framework (CDF) and poverty reduction strat-
egies as the central mechanisms for lending to low-income de-
veloping countries. The approach does not change the division 
of responsibilities between the international financial institu-
tions, but enhances the development impact of the partnership.   
The CDF text reconfirms the importance of the macroeconom-
ic framework, but goes on to state:
We cannot adopt a system in which the macroeconomic and fi-
nancial is considered apart from the structural, social and human as-
pects, and vice versa. Integration of each of these subjects is impera-
tive at the national level and among global players.
In short, the primary responsibility of the IMF remains 
macroeconomic stabilisation and surveillance, but it is an inev-
itable consequence of the CDF approach that the IMF increas-
ingly considers its impact on the development objectives for 
which the World Bank is primarily responsible.   
On the other hand, it is unclear whether the reorientation 
of the IFIs in the direction of poverty reduction will survive the 
test of time.  Some have advocated a back to basics approach, 
which would include taking the IMF out of long-term involve-
ment in countries, making its operations remote from human 
rights32. 
The IMF Articles of Agreement do not include a provi-
sion comparable to Article IV, 10 of the IBRD Articles of Agree-
ment, but “the practice of the organisation has nevertheless been 
to exclude any questions not of an economic or financial nature 
from its decision-making processes”33. In August 1997, howev-
er, the Executive Board of the IMF adopted Guidelines regard-
30 Art. IV, section 3, b.
31  Gianviti still  maintains  this  position,  see Gianviti,  F., 
(2001), par. 56.
32 For an overview of IMF reform proposals, see Bird, G. 
(2001), “A suitable case for treatment? Understanding the 
ongoing debate about the IMF”, Third world quarterly, Vol. 
22:5, 823-848.  See also different contributions in Nayyar, 
D. (Ed.) (2002), Governing globalization. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press and Einhorn, J. (2001), “The World Bank’s 
mission creep”, Foreign affairs. Vol. 80, 5: 22-35.
33 Boisson de Chazournes, L. in Institut International des 
droits de l’homme (Ed.)(2001)51.12 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2002-07 IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2002-07 • 13
ing governance issues34, which enabled management “to seek in-
formation about the political situation in Member Countries as 
an essential element in judging the prospects for policy imple-
mentation”.  The  Guidelines  identify  a  number  of  governance 
problems, including corruption and the quality of key adminis-
trative functions of government as integral to the IMF’s normal 
activities. Certainly, the concerns addressed are relevant from a 
human rights perspective.
Nevertheless, it is far from evident to construct affirma-
tive duties on behalf of the International Monetary Fund to act 
for the realisation of general rules of human rights on the basis of 
the IMF’s purposes and functions. The key obligation under the 
general rules of human rights as applicable to the IMF is a pro-
hibitive one, i.e. the prohibition to violate, or become complicit 
in human rights violations.
The IMF General Counsel, François Gianviti, denies that 
the IMF is under a duty to ensure that its actions do not adversely 
affect human rights, or do not undermine the Borrower’s compli-
ance with human rights obligations. In Gianviti’s view35, it is up 
to the Borrower, not to the Fund, to raise considerations related 
to the implementation of human rights. The IMF has no general 
mandate to ensure that its members abide by their international 
obligations. Only obligations relevant to the Fund’s purposes, i.e. 
the Borrower’s financial obligations to the Fund and other lend-
ers can be considered by the Fund36. The reference in the IMF 
Articles of Agreement to the need to respect the domestic social 
and political policies of members, further constrains the Fund’s 
ability to raise social development issues.
No doubt, the primary responsibility for raising human 
rights obligations in financial discussions lies with the Borrow-
er. The Borrower’s responsibility for human rights remains un-
abated in the context of negotiations with the IMF. As soon as 
the government raises human rights objections in discussions 
with the IMF, however, these objections come within the realm 
of Article IV, 3,b of the IMF Articles of Agreement. The social 
policies of the Borrower may well include international com-
mitments to economic, social and cultural rights, and in such cir-
cumstances Article IV, 3, b functions as a requirement to take 
into account human rights effects, rather than as an impediment, 
as Gianviti argues. Once the Borrower raises human rights obli-
gations as having an impact on what the government is willing 
to accept in order to obtain IMF assistance, the IMF cannot rea-
sonably argue that these obligations are irrelevant to its work, as 
defined in the Articles of Agreement.  
34  See Guidelines regarding governance issues (4 August 
1997), published in IMF Survey (1997), Vol. 26: 234-238. 
The Guidelines on conditionality (Decision No. 6056(79/
38), Executive Board IMF (2 March 1979)), adopted by the 
Executive Board of the Fund in 1979, limit the perform-
ance criteria the IMF may  “normally” use to macro-eco-
nomic variables.  In 1991, the then Special Rapporteur of 
the UN Sub-Commission on the prevention on discrimi-
nation and protection of minorities on structural adjust-
ment, Danilo Türk, proposed the adoption by the Fund of 
basic policy guidelines on structural adjustment and eco-
nomic, social and cultural rights, that could serve as a ba-
sis for dialogue between the financial institution and hu-
man rights bodies. The suggestion was well received by 
the  human  rights  bodies,  but  not  by  the  Fund.  Danilo 
Türk’s final report is UN doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1992/16.
35 Gianviti, F. (2001), par 28-36.
36 On the principle of specialisation, and the strained re-
lationship between the principle and the current holistic 
approach to development, compare De Feyter, K. (2001), 
71-72, 80-81, and 103. Specialisation can co-exist with a 
comprehensive approach to development, on the condition 
that care is taken to avoid damage to other, equally impor-
tant aspects of development, for which the organisation is 
not primarily responsible. Compare also Norton: “Effec-
tive social policy can, in particular, ease the task of ad-
justment during times of crises, helping build support for 
necessary refocus and ensuring that the burden of adjust-
ment does not fall disproportionately on the poorest and 
most vulnerable groups in society”; see Norton, J. (1999) 
“A “New International Financial Architecture?” - Reflec-
tions on the possible law-based dimension”, The Interna-
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On the other hand, even if the Borrower does not raise 
human rights obligations, the autonomous obligation of the IMF 
under general rules of human rights prohibiting the organisation 
as an international legal person from becoming involved in hu-
man rights violations still stands.  Consequently, the IMF would 
be well advised to engage in an in-house human rights impact 
assessment of the measures it proposes. Human rights impact 
assessment is not current IMF practice. 
In addition, it is of interest to note, however, that Gianviti 
acknowledges that Fund involvement depends on an assessment 
of whether a program is viable and likely to be implemented:
This means that, if a program is so strict that it is likely to gen-
erate strong popular opposition, it may not be implemented, and the 
Fund should not support it37.
The statement opens the door for civil society. Under cur-
rent policy, the IMF may well consider human rights impact if 
civil society actors manage to mobilise sufficiently “strong pop-
ular opposition” on the basis of a platform demonstrating that 
proposed measures are “so strict” as to adversely affect human 
rights. 
1.2.2. World Bank operational policies and guidelines  
    related to poverty reduction strategies
  The World Bank has issued a variety of instruc-
tions to staff, determining standards for the conduct of oper-
ations38. Operational Policies, Bank Procedures and the older 
Operational Directives are binding on staff, unless their word-
ing suggests otherwise. Potentially, these guidelines can be used 
as mechanisms to ensure that World Bank funded projects are 
consistent  with  international  law”39.  This  section  reviews  to 
what extent the current guidelines reflect human rights.
 
No single World Bank operational policy on human rights 
exists, although no legal obstacle prevents the adoption of such 
a policy. Whether the Bank should have one operational poli-
cy on the whole range of human rights is an issue for debate.   
Such an instrument would raise the profile of human rights in 
Bank practice, and would allow addressing the relevance of hu-
man rights to World Bank activities in a systematic way.  On the 
other hand, inevitably the World Bank human rights standards 
would be self-defined. It is the essence of self-regulation that 
norms reflect the standards of the relevant professional group. A 
37 Gianviti, F. (2001), par. 51.
38 The  World  Bank’s  Operational  Manual  contains  the 
following  typology  of  the  different  instruments  through 
which Bank Management (after Board approval) issues in-
structions to staff responsible for determining the Bank’s 
position on granting loans for specific projects:
  Operational Policies (OPs) are short, focused statements 
that follow from the Bank’s Articles of Agreement, the gen-
eral conditions, and policies approved by the Board.  OPs 
establish the parameters for the conduct of operations; they 
also describe the circumstances under which exceptions to 
policy are admissible and spell out who authorises excep-
tions.
  Bank Procedures (BPs) explain how Bank staff carries 
out the policies set out in the OPs.  They spell out the pro-
cedures and documentation required to ensure Bank wide 
consistency and quality.
  Good Practices (GPs) contain advice and guidance on 
policy implementation for example, the history of the is-
sue, the sectoral context, analytical framework, best prac-
tice examples. 
  Operational Directives (ODs) contain a mixture of poli-
cies, procedures, and guidance.  The ODs are gradually be-
ing replaced by OPs/BPs/GPs, which present policies, pro-
cedures and guidance separately.
39 The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights has urged the Bank and other agencies to fully re-
spect such guidelines in so far as they reflect the obligations 
in the Covenant” UN Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, General Comment no. 7(1997): The right 
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tentative World Bank operational policy on human rights would 
differ from general international human rights law, for better or 
for worse. 
The alternative would be to adopt an instrument commit-
ting Bank staff to observe existing international human rights 
law, while ensuring that detailed levels of human rights protec-
tion are incorporated in specific Bank policies particularly rele-
vant to human rights, such as the policies on involuntary resettle-
ment and structural adjustment.
Only one current Operational Directive uses human rights 
terminology.  Operational Directive 4.20 on Indigenous peoples 
states40:
The Bank’s broad objective towards indigenous people, as for 
all the people in its member countries, is to ensure that the develop-
ment process fosters full respect for their dignity, human rights, and 
cultural uniqueness. More specifically, the objective at the center of 
this directive is to ensure that indigenous peoples do not suffer ad-
verse effects during the development process, particularly from Bank-
financed projects, and that they receive culturally compatible social 
and economic benefits41.
The Operational Directive has a broad personal scope, in-
cluding all “social groups with a social and cultural identity dis-
tinct from the dominant society that makes them vulnerable to 
being disadvantaged in the development process”42. On the oth-
er hand, in the on-going revision process, there appears to be a 
move away from the broader language towards a narrower focus 
on indigenous peoples and similarly disadvantaged groups43. The 
Bank’s human rights approach thus remains ad hoc.  Indigenous 
peoples are an issue in Bank practice, and therefore they are sin-
gled out as subjects of human rights. 
References to rights to natural resources appear sporadi-
cally in the operational policies44. 
International environmental law figures more prominent-
ly in the operational policies45. OP 4.01 on Environmental assess-
ment is exemplary. This operational policy states that environ-
mental assessment will i.a. take into account: 
Obligations of the country, pertaining to project activities, un-
der  relevant  international  environmental  treaties  and  agreements.   
The Bank does not finance project activities that would contravene 
such country obligations, as identified during the EA.46.
40 OD 4.20 (September 1991), par. 6.
41  OD 4.20 is under revision, and will be replaced by Op-
erational Policy/Bank Procedure 4.10 on Indigenous Peo-
ples.  A consultation process with external stakeholders 
is currently on going.  The most recent draft (23 March 
2001) available from the World Bank website, moves the 
reference to human rights up to the first paragraph of the 
text in a section entitled ‘Overview’.  The proposed text 
states, “the broad objective of this policy is to ensure that 
the development process fosters full respect for the dig-
nity, human rights and cultures of indigenous peoples, 
thereby contributing to the Bank’s mission of poverty re-
duction and sustainable development”.  Note the deletion 
of the reference to “all the people”, that appears in the cur-
rent text.   
42 OD 4.20 (September 1991), par. 3.  Compare also draft 
OP 4.10 (23 March 2001), par. 4: “social groups with a so-
cial and cultural identity that is distinct from the domi-
nant groups in society and that makes them vulnerable 
to being disadvantaged in the development process”.  For 
an application stressing the need to interpret the scope 
of  the  Operational  Directive  as  applying  to  all  groups 
with a vulnerable status, see Inspection Panel, Investi-
gation Report on Nepal: Arun III Proposed hydroelectric 
project (22 June 1995), par. 110-113. All Inspection Pan-
el reports are available from the Inspection Panel website: 
www.worldbank.org/ipn.
43 Compare also the findings on the non-applicability of 
OD 4.20 to project-affected ethnic groups in Chad in In-
spection Panel, Investigation report on Chad-Cameroon 
petroleum and pipeline project (17 July 2002), par. 202.
44 In human rights treaties, the right to exploit natural re-
sources appears as a component of the right to self-de-
termination.  In  identifying  projects,  which  require  the 
informed participation of indigenous peoples, OD 4.20 
refers to projects “affecting indigenous peoples and their 
rights to natural and economic resources” (OD 4.20(Sep-
tember 1991), par. 8.). OP 4.36 on Forestry requires from 
client countries that they “safeguard the interests of forest 
dwellers, specifically their rights of access to and use of 
designated forest areas” (OP 4.36 (September 1993), par. 
D,iv). OD 4.30 on Involuntary resettlement refers to cus-
tomary rights to the land or other resources held by people 
adversely affected by the project (OD 4.30 (June 1990), 
par. 3,e.) and to the need to treat customary and formal 
rights as equally as possible (Ibid., par. 17). The conver-
sion process of OD 4.30 into a new OP/BP 4.12 is almost 
complete.  The draft OP 4.12 introduces distinctions as to 
the compensation that should be provided by the Borrow-
er between those holding rights to land recognised under 
domestic law and those holding no such rights. For a cri-
tique from an NGO coalition, see an open letter by the 
Forest Peoples Programme to the Executive Directors of 
the World Bank and the IMF, headed “Concerns about the 
weakening of World Bank safeguard policies” (2 March 
2001), available from the organisation.
45 For additional examples, see Boisson de Chazour-nes, 
L.,  “Compliance with operational standards: the contri-
bution of the World Bank Inspection Panel” in Alfreds-
son, G. & Ring, R. (Eds.)(2001), The Inspection Panel of 
the World Bank. The Hague: M.Nijhoff, 78.
46 OP 4.01 on Environmental assessment  (January 1999), 
par. 316 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2002-07 IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2002-07 • 17
OP 4.36 on Forestry goes one step further, in insisting 
that the Borrower provides a level of protection equal to the lev-
el guaranteed at the international level, even if the Borrower has 
not previously accepted such obligations. The operational poli-
cy simply states:
The Bank does not finance projects that contravene applicable 
international environmental agreements47.
No legal obstacle prevents the adoption of a similar state-
ment prohibiting the Bank from financing projects that contra-
vene applicable international human rights law. The legal nature 
of both branches of law is similar. They both consist of relative-
ly succinct binding provisions of treaty law and customary law, 
clarified by a whole series of declarations, resolutions, guide-
lines,  codes  of  conduct,  and  authoritative  comments  by  ex-
pert bodies intended to ensure best practices as new situations 
emerge48. It is submitted that the different treatment of interna-
tional environmental and international human rights law con-
tradicts the logic of the Bank’s self-adopted rules, and the logic 
of international law in the field of sustainable development49.
It could be argued that the operational policies, even if 
they do not use human rights language, still offer a degree of hu-
man rights protection. 
In the area of civil and political rights, a number of pro-
visions pertaining to required levels of participation of project-
affected groups are relevant. Clauses vary considerably, from 
general encouragements to actively involve beneficiaries and 
NGOs50 to fairly specific requirements insisting on regular con-
sultations by the Borrower51.  
In the area of economic, social and cultural rights the op-
erational  directives  on  poverty  reduction  and  on  adjustment 
lending policy are of particular interest. The Operational Di-
rective on Poverty reduction recognises that sustainable pover-
ty reduction i.a. requires “improved access to education, health 
care, and other social services”52. The section on structural ad-
justment53 states:
47 Ibid., par. 2.
48 Compare Birnie, P.,  “International environmental law: 
its adequacy for present and future needs” in Hurrell, A., 
Kingsbury, B. (Eds.) (1992), The international politics of 
the environment. Oxford: Clarendon Press,83.
49 The international law in the field of sustainable develop-
ment has been described as “a broad umbrella accommo-
dating the specialised fields of international law which aim 
to promote economic development, environmental protec-
tion and respect for civil and political rights”; it is based on 
“an approach requiring existing principles, rules and insti-
tutional arrangements to be treated in an integrated man-
ner”. See Sands, P. (1995) “International law in the field of 
sustainable development”, British yearbook of internation-
al law1995, 379.
50 OP 4.15 (December 1991) on Poverty reduction, par. 39.
51  See OD 4.30 (June 1990) on Involuntary resettlement, 
par. 8 and OD 4.20 on Indigenous peoples, par. 8 and 14,a, 
OP 4.04 (June 2001) on Natural habitats, par. 10.
52 OD 4.15 on Poverty reduction, par. 3.
53 Compare  also  OD  8.60  on  Adjustment  lending  policy 
(December 1992). OD 8.60 is hugely ambivalent on how the 
balance between structural adjustment and the provision of 
social services is to be struck. The OD only requires a spe-
cific focus on poverty reduction in the course of adjustment 
operations when country circumstances so determine, - not 
on a systematic basis.  On the other hand, even if a specific 
focus is absent, the Bank “should support the government’s 
efforts to reduce poverty and mitigate the social costs of ad-
justment”.  Compare with the UN Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights’ recommendation that “the goal 
of protecting the rights of the poor and vulnerable should 
become a basic objective of economic adjustment”.  See UN 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Gen-
eral Comment no.2 (1990) on international technical assist-
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Within the overall spending envelope given by the macroeco-
nomic framework, special efforts should be made to safeguard, and 
increase where appropriate, budgetary allocations for basic health, 
nutrition, and education, including programs that benefit the most vul-
nerable groups among the poor.  Institutional reform and development 
should also be supported as necessary to ensure that the benefits of 
policy reach the poor54.
The Operational Directive does not, however, include rec-
ognition of the need to ensure a minimum essential level of eco-
nomic, social and cultural rights55.
Finally, although there is no doubt that the operational 
policies are binding on staff (wording permitting), Bank prac-
tice may well fall below the standards. The effectiveness of self-
regulation depends on the internal discipline of the organisation, 
and on the commitment of Board and staff at different levels to 
implementation56. 
Operational policies govern the granting of loans by the 
World Bank for specific projects. They do not cover the area of 
poverty reduction strategies57. Those strategies are part of the 
IFIs approach to debt relief58. Briefly: debt relief is i.a. condi-
tioned on the adoption and implementation of a poverty reduc-
tion strategy by the relevant country. PRSP Strategies are in-
tended to be country-driven, i.e. to be prepared and developed 
transparently with broad participation of civil society, key do-
nors and other relevant international financial institutions.  
Ultimately, the PRSP takes the form of a tri-partite agree-
ment between the government, the IMF and the World Bank59.   
This means that government needs to present the PRSP for ap-
proval to the Executive Boards of the World Bank and the IMF. 
Approval is given on the basis of a Joint IMF/World Bank Staff 
Assessment (JSA).  Guidelines for Joint Staff Assessments have 
been adopted60.  Human rights terminology or references to the 
human rights obligations of governments are absent from these 
JSA Guidelines61. There is no requirement for Bank and Fund 
54 Ibid., par. 24. A fascinating elaboration of the role of the 
World Bank in social protection is World Bank (2001), So-
cial protection sector strategy.  From safety net to spring-
board. Washington: World Bank.
55 The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights is of the view that the realisation of minimum es-
sential levels of economic, social and cultural rights is the 
minimum core obligation under the International Cove-
nant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.  See UN 
Committee  on  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural  Rights, 
General Comment no. 3 (1990) on the nature of States par-
ties’ obligations, par. 10. 
56 The findings of the Inspection Panel on staff compli-
ance with operational policies are sobering.  See in par-
ticular, Inspection Panel, Investigation report on the Chi-
na Western poverty reduction project (28 April 2000), par. 
34. 
57 The  poverty  reduction  strategies  are  an  “operation-
al vehicle, which can be a specific output of the compre-
hensive  development  framework  or  of  processes  based 
on  CDF  principles”.  See  Joint  note  by  James  Wolfen-
sohn and Stanley Fischer, “The Comprehensive develop-
ment framework and poverty reduction strategy papers” 
(5 April 2000).
58 The Executive Boards of the IMF and the World Bank 
endorsed the adoption of the poverty reduction strategy 
paper approach on 21 December 1999 [see IMF Press re-
lease no. 99/65 (22 December 1999)].
59 On  progress  made  so  far,  consider  IMF/IDA  (2001), 
Poverty reduction strategy papers. Progress in implemen-
tation, Washington: IMF/IDA. 
60 The Guidelines appear as Annex 2 to IMF/IDA (2001) 
22-27. The JSA “must make an overall assessment for the 
Executive Boards as to whether or not the strategy pre-
sented  in  the  PRSP  constitutes  a  sound  basis  for  con-
cessional assistance from the Fund and the Bank” (JSA 
Guidelines, par. 2).
61 E.g. in the section on indicators of progress in poverty 
reduction, reference is made to the international develop-
ment goals, and to “indicators and targets which appropri-
ately capture disparities by social group, gender and re-
gion” (JSA Guidelines, par. C.1), but not to indicators and 
benchmarks developed to monitor and assess the enjoy-
ment of economic, social and cultural rights.  On such in-
dicators and benchmarks, see International Human rights 
internship program, Asian Forum for human rights and 
development (2000), Circle of rights. Washington: IHRIP, 
365-391. For a general human rights critique of the pover-
ty reduction strategies, see Cheru, F., “The Highly Indebt-
ed Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative: a human rights as-
sessment of the poverty reduction strategy papers”, UN 
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staff to take into account the human rights obligations of the 
Borrower.  Some of the assessment criteria are relevant from a 
human rights perspective62.
The poverty reduction strategies are in effect a country’s 
development plan on attacking poverty in the up-coming peri-
od, involving also external actors.  If human rights are not in-
tegrated into such plans, they stand little chance of being pri-
oritised. The Office of the UN High Commissioner for human 
rights was late in identifying the risk, but, in 2001, at the re-
quest of the UN Committee on ESC rights, put together a team 
of experts to draft guidelines on the integration of human rights 
into the poverty reduction strategies.  The target audience of the 
guidelines are “practitioners involved in the design of the strat-
egies”, primarily States, but also other actors committed to the 
eradication of poverty63.
1.3.  Human rights obligations under international  
    agreements to which the IFIs are parties
  Human rights obligations for the international fi-
nancial institutions may also result from international agree-
ments to which they are parties.  Two completely different types 
of agreements are discussed below: 
- The relationship agreements the international financial 
institutions concluded with the United Nations through which 
the IFIs obtained the status of UN specialised agencies;
- The loan agreements the World Bank concludes with 
Borrower countries.
 
1.3.1.  Relationship agreements
  An  organisation  wishing  to  be  recognised  as  a 
United Nations specialised agency needs to be brought into re-
lationship with the central bodies of the UN64. This is achieved 
through the conclusion of a relationship agreement between the 
United Nations and the relevant intergovernmental organisa-
tion.  
Such relationship agreements contain provisions on in-
formation sharing, but more importantly in this context, they 
also include an obligation on behalf of the specialised agency to 
assist in achieving the objectives of international economic and 
social co-operation as defined in Article 55 UN Charter.  Uni-
62  They include the existence of mechanisms used to con-
sult the poor and their representatives, the extent to which 
the PRSP has estimated the likely impact of its proposed 
policy measures on the poor and included measures to miti-
gate any negative impacts; the existence of measures to pro-
mote fair and equitable treatment of poor men and women 
under the law and avenues of recourse, including with re-
spect to property rights; proposals on steps to be taken to 
improve transparency and ensure accountability of public 
institutions and services vis-à-vis the needs and priorities 
of the poor (See JSA Guidelines, par. A.1, D.5, D.6, D.7).
63 At the time of writing, an electronic version of the Draft 
Guidelines: a human rights approach to poverty reduction 
strategies (10 September 2002) was available from the OH-
CHR website.  The team of experts were Paul Hunt, Man-
fred Nowak and Siddiq Osmani.
64  In practice via the Economic and Social Council, see 
art. 63, UN Charter. Relationship agreements need to be 
approved by the UN General Assembly. On relationship 
agreements, see Manin, A., “Article 63” in Cot, J., Pellet, 
A. (Eds.) (1991), La Charte des Nations Unies.  Paris: Eco-
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versal respect and observance of human rights appears as one 
of the major goals of international economic and social co-op-
eration in Article 55 of the UN Charter. In addition, the Char-
ter identifies the promotion and encouragement of respect for hu-
man rights as one of the principal purposes of the UN65.
Both  the  World  Bank  and  the  International  Monetary 
Fund  have  concluded  relationship  agreements  with  the  Unit-
ed Nations66. Consequently, the IFIs are under an obligation to 
contribute to the universal respect for, and observance of human 
rights. The UN Committee on Economic and Social Rights has 
admirably summarised the human rights implications of obtain-
ing the status of a specialised agency:
In negative terms this means that the international agencies 
should scrupulously avoid involvement in projects which, for exam-
ple, involve the use of forced labour in contravention of internation-
al standards, or promote or reinforce discrimination against individ-
uals or groups contrary to the provisions of the Covenant, or involve 
large-scale evictions or displacement of persons without the provision 
of all appropriate protection and compensation. In positive terms, it 
means that, wherever possible, the agencies should act as advocates 
of projects and approaches, which contribute, not only to economic 
growth or other broadly defined objectives, but also to enhanced en-
joyment of the full range of human rights67.
In other words, although the legal basis of the obligations 
is different, the result is similar to what is achieved when the ob-
ligations are derived from general rules of international law. 
1.3.2. Loan agreements 
  The international financial institutions have the ca-
pacity under international law to conclude agreements necessary 
for the achievement of their objectives.  Loan agreements con-
cluded by the World Bank with Borrower States belong to this 
group68. 
The  loan  agreements  are  treaties  concluded  between  a 
State and an international organisation, governed by internation-
al law69, that are equally binding for the Borrower and for the 
Bank.  Depending on the attitude adopted by the domestic legal 
system to international law, loan agreements may supersede do-
mestic law70.  
65  Art. 1, par. 3 UN Charter (26 June 1945).
66  Agreement between the UN and the IBRD (15 April 
1948), and Agreement between the UN and the IMF (15 
April 1948). Article 1, par. 2 of the UN-IBRD Relation-
ship Agreement states that the Bank is a specialised agen-
cy  with  wide  responsibilities  in  economic  and  related 
fields within the meaning of Article 57 of the UN Charter. 
The Article also adds that the Bank is, and is required to 
function as, an independent organisation.
67  UN  Committee  on  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural 
Rights, General Comment No. 2 (1990), UN doc. E/1990/ 
23, Annexe III, par. 6.
68 According to Skogly, IMF practice is not to enter into 
treaties  with  Member  States.    Stand-by  arrangements, 
the legal instruments through which resources are made 
available to members are not legally binding, but are gov-
erned by ‘soft law’.  See Skogly, S. (2001), 30-32.
69 Amerasinghe, C. (1996), Principles of the institution-
al law of international organizations, Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1996, 246. See also Skogly, S. 
(2001), 28-30.
70 For an example, see Inspection Panel, Report and rec-
ommendation  on  request  for  inspection  on  India:  Eco-
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From the Bank’s perspective, the loan agreements are im-
portant instruments for ensuring consistency with operational 
procedures71. By including the provisions of operational policies 
in loan agreements, binding international obligations are cre-
ated both for the Borrower and for the Bank. Through the loan 
agreements, the operational policies become law for both par-
ties. In any case, the agreements give the Bank the right to insist 
on compliance by the Borrower, which may be particularly help-
ful when domestic legislation provides less protection to benefi-
ciaries than World Bank standards72. 
On the other hand, the loan agreements are also a source 
of legal obligation for the Bank. The failure on the part of the 
Bank to implement its obligations under a loan agreement in-
volves its international responsibility73. Responsibility arises di-
rectly from the breach of the obligations, as long as the conduct 
is attributable to the organisation74. 
From a human rights perspective, the inclusion of provi-
sions offering human rights protection to persons affected by 
projects would be a step forward. Although those suffering hu-
man rights violations as a consequence of non-compliance with 
the agreement would not have standing to invoke the agreement 
directly, they might be able to resort to tort law. The argument 
would be that the Bank had breached its duty to take care by not 
contemplating the injurious effect of non-compliance on the af-
fected persons. In determining what the standard of care is, a do-
mestic court might well take into account the Bank’s own pro-
fessional standards as evidenced by the operational policies75. 
If such a claim were attempted, the Bank would no doubt argue 
that the Borrower rather than the Bank should be held responsi-
ble for lack of implementation76. On the other hand, a finding on 
joint responsibilities would certainly be possible77.   
71 Shihata, I. (1991), 183.
72 Whether the Bank actually insists on compliance, is a 
different matter. In Argentina/Paraguay: Yacyreta hydro-
electric project the requesters argued that the Bank had 
failed to ensure the adequate execution of environmental 
mitigation and resettlement activities by not supervising 
and enforcing the relevant legal covenants. Management 
replied that it was an essential principle of Bank opera-
tions that the exercise of legal remedies was not a require-
ment, but a discretionary tool, to be applied only after other 
reasonable means of persuasion had failed. The Inspection 
Panel conceded that there was some room for flexibility, 
but also pointed out that the Panel’s constituent resolution 
identifies the failure by the Bank to follow up on the bor-
rower’s obligations under loan agreements with respect to 
operational policies as a ground for possible requests. The 
Bank was under an obligation to ensure timely implemen-
tation of the loan agreement, and, in the case under review, 
had failed to do so by accepting repeated violations of ma-
jor covenants in the agreements. See Inspection Panel Re-
port and recommendation on Argentina/Paraguay: Yacy-
creta hydroelectric (26 November 1996), par. 9, 28-31.
73 Amerasinghe, C. (1996), 240.
74 Compare  Scobbie,  I.,  “International  organisations  and 
international  relations”  in  Dupuy,  R.J.  (Ed.)  (1998),  A 
handbook  on  international  organizations,  Dordrecht:  M. 
Nijhoff,  887.  It  is  generally  accepted  that  the  custom-
ary rules regulating State responsibility are, in principle, 
equally applicable to international organisations.
75 Shihata argues that the mere failure by the Bank to ob-
serve its policies would rarely amount to a fault under appli-
cable law: “these policies typically require high standards 
beyond what borrowers or their foreign financiers other-
wise need to observe under national or international law”.   
See Shihata, I. in Alfredsson, G.,  Ring, R. (Eds.) (2001), 
42-43.  It is a hypothesis worth testing. 
76 Compare Schlemmer-Schulte, who argues that the Pan-
el’s assessment of a failure by the Bank to comply with its 
own policies does not lead to Bank liability, but “the Panel’s 
assessment however may indirectly contribute to the deter-
mination of borrower actions which could constitute a fault 
under domestic law (...) the Panel’s determination of Bank 
actions could provide an analysis that constitutes a factu-
al basis for those who wish to present a claim against the 
borrower under domestic law.  See Schlemmer-Schulte, S. 
(1998), „The World Bank’s experience with its inspection 
panel”, Zeitschrift für ausländisches und öffentliches Re-
cht und Völkerrecht. Vol.58, 2: 368.
77 Joint responsibility could be construed by using a con-
cept of complicity between multiple tortfeasers. In a paper 
on business complicity in human rights abuses, Clapham 
and Jerbi develop a theory that may be useful here as well.   
The authors distinguish between direct, beneficial and si-
lent complicity Clapham, A., Jerbi, S.  (2001) “Categories 
of corporate complicity in human rights abuses”, Hastings 
international and comparative law journal. Vol. 24: 339-
350). Direct complicity requires intentional participation, 
but not necessarily any intention to do harm, only knowl-
edge of the likely harmful effects of the assistance given.   
In our example, the argument could be made that the Bank 
could have foreseen that the loan agreement would not be 
implemented, if staff did not ensure proper follow-up.  Pri-
mary responsibility might still be attributed to the Bor-
rower, but the Bank could be held responsible for aiding 
or assisting the State in the commission of a wrongful act. 
Indirect complicity implies that benefits are derived from 
harm committed by somebody else. The authors quote the 
example of human rights violations committed by securi-
ty forces in the context of a common operation. Silent com-
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1.4.  Jurisdictional immunity
  The rationale for allocating privileges and immuni-
ties is “to enable organisations to function properly without un-
due interference in their affairs by States and thus ensure the in-
dependent discharge of the tasks entrusted to them”78.  
Such privileges and immunities are functional, i.e. limited 
to what is necessary for achieving the organisations’ purpose79. 
The IBRD Articles of Agreement recognise that its immunities 
and privileges should “enable the Bank to fulfil the functions 
with which it is entrusted”80. The needs of organisations differ, 
and so do their immunities. On jurisdictional immunity in the 
courts of Member States, the IBRD Articles of Agreement pro-
vide:
Actions may be brought against the Bank only in a court of com-
petent jurisdiction in the territories of a member in which the Bank has 
an office, has appointed an agent for the purpose of accepting serv-
ice or notice of process, or has issued or guaranteed securities. No ac-
tions shall, however, be brought by members or persons acting for or 
deriving claims from members.  The property and assets of the Bank 
shall, wheresoever located and by whomsoever held, be immune from 
all forms of seizure, attachment or execution before the delivery of the 
final judgement against the Bank81.
The primary purpose of the provision was to provide im-
munity against suits brought by the Borrower in its own courts 
originating in loan agreements to which the State is a party82.   
One can understand the Bank’s concern in not wishing to submit 
to the domestic courts of the party with which it is involved in a 
legal dispute.  Still, the consequences are harsh.  Borrowers have 
no legal remedy against the Bank, even when the Bank recognis-
es internally that mistakes were made. 
The situation is different for adversely affected parties, 
however.  Amerasinghe  argues  that  there  is  a  presumption  of 
absence  of  immunity  except  in  the  circumstances  mentioned 
above83. The immunity of the Bank is of a restricted kind, being 
limited to claims by member States or persons deriving claims 
from member States. The immunity therefore does not cover dis-
putes with private parties, unless they derive their claims from 
member States or would prevent the Bank from fulfilling the 
functions for which it was established. A claim based on Bank 
negligence, as discussed above, would not come within that cat-
egory. The Bank would still enjoy immunity in other respects, 
but the immunity standard would be “result-oriented”, i.e. only 
78 Scobbie, I.,  in Dupuy, R.J. (Ed.)(1998), 833.
79 Amerasinghe, C. (1996),  370.
80 IBRD Articles of Agreement (27 December 1944), art. 
VII,  1.  Similarly,  IMF  Articles  of  Agreement  (22  July 
1944), art. IX, 1.
81 IBRD Articles of Agreement (27 December 1944), art. 
VII, 3.  In contrast, the IMF Articles of Agreement pro-
vide for immunity from every form of judicial process, 
except to the extent that the IMF waives its immunity for 
the purpose of any proceedings or by the terms of any con-
tract.  See IMF Articles of Agreement (22 July 1944), art. 
IX, 3.
82 Amerasinghe, C. (1996), 375.
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shield against claims that threaten the Bank’s existence or pre-
vent it from fulfilling its core functions84. The case would be de-
cided primarily under domestic, rather than international law85.   
No success could be hoped for without an independent judici-
ary that is at least minimally sympathetic to claims advanced by 
vulnerable groups within society.
Alternatively, the Bank could commit to a policy of waiv-
ing immunity in cases where parties claim their human rights 
have been adversely affected as a consequence of Bank actions 
or omissions. A suitable international forum for such a case 
might be the Permanent Court of Arbitration, which has adopt-
ed Optional Rules for arbitration between international organi-
sations and private parties.
2.  The practice
2.1.  The World Bank Inspection Panel
  The World Bank created the Inspection Panel in 
199386.  The Panel members adopted its operating procedures in 
August 199487, and the Panel became operational in September 
of the same year.
The Inspection Panel is competent to receive requests for 
inspection presented to it by an affected party demonstrating:
That its rights or interests have been or are likely to be direct-
ly affected by an action or omission of the Bank as a result of a fail-
ure of the Bank to follow its operational policies and procedures with 
respect to the design, appraisal and/or implementation of a project fi-
nanced by the Bank (including situations where the Bank is alleged to 
have failed in its follow-up on the borrower’s obligations under loan 
agreements with respect to such policies and procedures) provided 
in all cases that such failure has had, or threatens to have, a materi-
al adverse effect.88
The  Inspection  Panel  is  limited  to  reporting  on  Bank 
compliance with its own policies. The Panel is not competent to 
establish violations of international law, including human rights 
law. On the other hand, nothing prevents the requesters from ar-
guing that their human rights have been adversely affected by 
Bank action. In the three cases reviewed below, they did.  Both 
the Management response and the Inspection Panel responded 
substantively to the human rights claims. Violations of human 
rights were considered, in so far as they were related to Bank 
conduct under the relevant operational policies.
84 Compare  Reinisch,  A.  (2000),  International  organisa-
tions before national courts. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press.  Dominicé has argued that the jurisdiction-
al immunity of international organisations before domestic 
courts should not prevail over the human rights of private 
individuals adversely affected, particularly if the individu-
al does not have access to any other tribunal.  See Domin-
icé, C. (1999), « Observations sur le contentieux des or-
ganisations internationales avec des personnes privées », 
Annuaire Français de droit international. Vol. XLV: 625, 
638. 
85 Note that on issues of immunity too, States are required 
under the IBRD Articles of Agreement “to make effec-
tive in terms of its own law the principles set forth in this 
Article”(Article VII, 10, IBRD Articles of Agreement (27 
December 1944).  Both the IBRD Articles of Agreement 
and the relevant domestic law would thus govern the dis-
pute.
86 Resolution No.93-10 of the Executive Directors estab-
lishing the Inspection Panel for the IBRD (22 September 
1993) and Resolution No. 93-6 for the IDA (22 September 
1993).
87 Inspection Panel for the IBRD and IDA, Operating pro-
cedures as adopted by the Panel (19 August 1994).  
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The Panel procedure is administrative rather than judicial 
in nature, allowing an important role for the Board in the differ-
ent stages of the procedure.  Panel reports are recommendatory 
only. The Executive Directors have decision-making power, both 
in whether or not to allow an investigation after the Panel’s eli-
gibility report, and in deciding on action after completion of the 
Panel’s investigation.  Board decisions are potentially a source of 
legal obligation for Bank staff, while the Inspection Panel’s find-
ings are not.
In practice, the Board never takes an express position on 
the findings of the Inspection Panel. The Board never identifies 
a specific Bank practice as a violation of Bank operational poli-
cies, and even less as a violation of human rights. The Board de-
cides on action, not on law. Decisions on action after a Panel in-
vestigation are “case by case, tailor-made”89, and in response to 
action points proposed by Management. At best, Board deci-
sions constitute an implicit endorsement of the Panel’s findings 
on non-compliance90. The Board of Executive Directors does 
not fulfil the functions usually associated with a decision-mak-
ing body in the judicial process. The Board does not clarify the 
scope of the provisions in the operational policies. It does not in-
terpret the legal implications of the policies. It does not facilitate 
internal application of the rules. It avoids establishing precedent. 
It does not deal with claimants. As a political body, the Board is 
concerned with maintaining cohesion among its diverse mem-
bership and good working relationships with staff, encouraging 
it to give precedence to pragmatism over principle. As such, the 
Board of Executive Directors is an unhelpful institution in pro-
moting World Bank self-regulation on human rights.
The Inspection Panel procedure does not provide for com-
pensation by the Bank to persons adversely affected by Bank ac-
tion that was held to be in violation of Bank operational poli-
cies. 
2.2.  India: Ecodevelopment
  The  India:  Ecodevelopment  project  demonstrates 
that in a multi-party development effort responsibility and ac-
countability to project ‘beneficiaries’ will tend to dissipate, un-
less the project facilitators make and implement detailed agree-
ments on how participatory rights will be ensured. As pointed 
out earlier, the right of people to participate in decisions that af-
fect their lives is an essential element of a human rights approach 
to development projects.  Participatory rights can be constructed 
89 Umana, A.,  “Some lessons from the Inspection Pan-
el’s experience” in Alfredsson, G., Ring, R.  (Eds.) (2001), 
139.  The author is a former Chairperson of the Inspection 
Panel.
90 Consequently, the legal impact of Inspection Panel re-
ports is quite limited.   In several reports, the Inspection 
Panel stresses that the investigation process has had a pos-
itive impact on the behaviour of relevant project staff, e.g. 
in Ecuador: Mining development and environmental con-
trol technical assistance, the Panel finds that there was a 
positive evolution toward the environmental dimensions 
of the Project, that “appears to have accelerated signifi-
cantly after the Request was received” (Inspection Pan-
el, Investigation report on Ecuador: Mining development 
and environmental control technical assistance project (23 
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both on the basis of civil and political rights, and on the basis of 
economic, social and cultural rights. In fact, the need for con-
sultation can also be justified from a purely economic rationale: 
knowledge is perceived of as a critical condition for optimum 
bargaining in a free market economy, both for decision-makers 
and consumers (i.e. affected populations)91.
The India Ecodevelopment project targets seven national 
parks in India, including Nagarahole National Park in Karnata-
ka State, southern India. The project aims at promoting conser-
vation of the environment through the provision of incentives 
and alternatives to peripheral populations around the seven tar-
get parks. The key objective is to reduce pressure on the parks 
from  the  resource  using  communities,  by  providing  for  re-
source-substitution activities92. 
The Indian Wildlife Protection Act of 1972 prohibits per-
sons from residing within a national park.  In 1997, the Supreme 
Court of India, at the request of the World Wildlife Fund for Na-
ture, urged State governments that had not yet done so to imple-
ment the act fully. The State government of Karnataka stopped 
providing basic services to tribal people inside the park, and did 
not include them in programs to be funded by the World Bank.   
Tribal NGOs were not part of the consultation process. The 
stage was thus set for a clash between the environmental agen-
da and indigenous peoples’ rights.
Although the concept of ecodevelopment in India predat-
ed World Bank involvement, the Bank played a crucial role as 
the largest financial contributor to the project:  the Bank was the 
key donor agency with responsibility for disbursing 71% of to-
tal funding93. The Bank did not, however, perceive itself as the 
key manager of the consultation process, although it did raise 
concerns about the indigenous people living inside the park, as 
mandated by World Bank Operational Directive 4.20.  The loan 
agreement concluded by the Government of India and the Bank 
provided that no involuntary resettlement of people resident in 
the park would be carried out, and that any voluntary reloca-
tion would need to meet the Bank’s criteria94. The overwhelm-
ing majority of the tribal residents wished to remain in the park.   
There was thus an obvious conflict between the loan agreement 
(an international treaty) and domestic Indian law95. Neither the 
Borrower, nor the Bank apparently pursued the conflict, and 
concentrated on other aspects of the project. In practice, none 
of the project facilitators felt responsible for implementing the 
provisions of the agreement dealing with the indigenous people, 
nor did they feel accountable to them.
91  Compare Botchway, F. (2000), “The role of the State in 
the context of good governance and electricity manage-
ment: comparative antecedents and current trends”, Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania journal of international economic 
law. Vol. 21,790-793.
92 See  Mahanty,  S.  (2002),  “Conservation  and  develop-
ment interventions as networks: the case of India Ecode-
velopment project, Karnataka”, World development. Vol. 
30,1371.
93 Ibid.
94 Inspection  Panel,  Report  and  recommendation  on  re-
quest for inspection on India: Ecodevelopment project (21 
October 1998), par.54.
95 Indian law provides that in such cases international law 
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The tribal rights alliance representing the tribals inside the 
park forced the other actors to open up a negotiating space for the 
indigenous, by filing a request with the Inspection Panel. The re-
questers argued  “a violation of our basic right to determine our 
future and to oppose a project that we think will have a negative 
impact on our lives, livelihood and the survival of our people”96.   
The adivasi had been denied input on the basic assumptions 
and concepts of the project that clearly affected their traditional 
rights to use the resources of the park97.
The request gave the Inspection Panel an opportunity to 
apply the human rights clause in the Operational Directive on 
Indigenous Peoples98. The Panel substantively concurred with 
the requesters, and recommended an investigation. In no uncer-
tain terms, the Panel found that Management, notwithstanding 
a history of mistrust between the tribal people and the govern-
ment, had denied the adivasi input, had overestimated the sup-
port for voluntary relocation, and had misconstrued the reality of 
the stay option. Tribal leaders had not been adequately informed, 
and documents not translated in the local language: “Information 
disclosure in a language understandable to the affected people 
is an obvious prerequisite to meaningful and informed consul-
tation”99. The requesters had proposed an “Alternative People’s 
Plan” to Bank representatives that was consulted with local lead-
ers, but received no response.  With a measure of irony, the In-
spection Panel notes that the alternative plan “would appear to 
warrant at least some consideration as IDA struggles “...to ensure 
that the development process fosters full respect for their digni-
ty, human rights and cultural uniqueness”, quoting directly from 
Operational Directive 4.20100.
The Inspection Panel came out strongly in favour of indig-
enous rights, and assisted the tribal organisations in achieving 
recognition. Perhaps predictably, however, both the Bank Man-
agement and the Karnataka State government criticised the Pan-
el’s findings. Bank Management denied all breaches of Bank pol-
icies. The Government of Karnataka argued that allowing the 
tribal groups to remain in the park would deprive them of the ed-
ucational, health and socio-economic facilities available outside 
the park. The relationship between both actors and the tribal or-
ganisations remained adversarial101.  
The Board of Executive Directors agreed that the Pan-
el’s findings needed to be addressed, instructed Management 
to work with government officials at state and federal levels on 
measures to address them, and to report back in six months. The 
Panel would be asked to give comments separately. The Execu-
96 Inspection Panel, Report and recommendation on re-
quest for inspection on India: Ecodevelopment project (21 
October 1998), par. 37
97 In addition, tribal organisations successfully went to 
Court to obtain a ban on the construction of a resort inside 
the park by the Taj hotels, of the Tata group companies, 
one of the largest business houses of India.  The Public In-
terest Legal Support and Research Center, a lawyer’s col-
lective brought the claim on their behalf. See Cheria, A. 
e.a. (1997), A search for justice.  A citizen’s report on the 
adivasi experience in South India. Bangalore: José Sebas-
tian, 184, 189-190.  
98 OD 4.20 on Indigenous peoples (September 1991), par. 
6. Panel Inspector McNeill visited Delhi and the project 
site n 30 August-4 September 1998. 
99 Inspection Panel, Report and recommendation on re-
quest for inspection on India: Ecodevelopment project (21 
October 1998, par. 42.
100 Ibid, par. 49-50.
101 Mahanty argues that the World Bank should have tried 
to broker the conflict at an earlier stage, since the lead 
agency (i.e. the state government) was heavily embroiled 
in the conflict. If real participation were to be achieved, 
a more detailed analysis of the groups involved and the 
space for dialogue would have been necessary in the plan-
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tive Directors did not, however, allow a full investigation as rec-
ommended by the Panel102.
2.3.  Nigeria: Lagos drainage and sanitation
  The Nigeria: Lagos drainage and sanitation request 
is of interest for at least two reasons. First, because the request-
ers strongly relied on human rights treaties to make their case, 
and secondly, because the story unravelled in a period of tre-
mendous political upheaval in Nigeria.
The aim of the IDA financed project was to improve the 
storm-water drainage system in parts of Lagos that suffered 
from regular inundation from heavy rains.  The project implied 
the removal of a number of shelters built by the slum dwellers 
that intruded into the drainage right of way.  The residents, only 
one of whom had a certificate of occupancy, were to be resettled 
and properly compensated.
The  IDA’s  Executive  Directors  approved  the  relevant 
credit on 17 June 1993. Five days earlier presidential elections 
had been held in Nigeria. The elections had been organised by 
Nigeria’s military ruler Babangida, and were to be the finale of 
Nigeria’s transition towards multiparty-democracy103. Interna-
tional observers deemed the elections fair and free. The first re-
sults showed a victory for presidential candidate Abiola.  On 26 
June 1993, however, before the final results were made public, 
President Babangida “stopped the hands of the nation clock”104 
and  announced  the  annulment  of  the  elections.  Thus  com-
menced one of the worst periods of Nigeria’s political history 
that was later characterised as a return to the dark ages and a pe-
riod of predatory rule105 that could have led to the total disinte-
gration of the country106.  General Abacha took power in a coup 
d’état in November 1993. Abacha’s regime committed gross and 
systematic violations of human rights that continued unabated 
until his death on 8 June 1998107. On 16 June 1998 the Lagos 
drainage and sanitation request was filed. 
At the origin of the request was a leading African human 
rights NGO, the Lagos-based Social and Economic Rights Ac-
tion Center (SERAC). The requesters argued that the Bank and 
the military government of Nigeria had failed to consult with 
affected communities “in flagrant violation of the Bank’s Op-
erational Directive, the Constitution of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights and other relevant international human rights 
102 See IDA/IBRD Press release on India: Ecodevelopment 
(22 December 1998).
103 See Rotimi, A., Ihonvbere, J. (1994) “Democratic im-
passe: remilitarisation in Nigeria”, Third world quarterly. 
Vol. 15,4: 669-689.
104 Soyinka, W. (1996), The open sore of a continent.  A per-
sonal narrative of the Nigerian crisis. Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 143. 
105 Note Gordon, K. (2002), “Multinational enterprises in 
situations of violent conflict and widespread human rights 
abuses”, OECD working paper on international investment, 
nr. 2002/1, par.42: “Money laundering authorities in Swit-
zerland reported in 2000 that banks had reported receiv-
ing about US$ 480 million moved there by Nigeria’s former 
president (General Abacha) and his entourage.  Following 
on from the Swiss investigation, the Financial Services Au-
thority of the United Kingdom found that US$ 1.3 billion 
from Nigeria had been “siphoned through” London Banks 
(...)”. 
106 See Abubakar, D. (2001), “Ethnic identity, democratisa-
tion, and the future of the African State: lessons from Ni-
geria”, African issues. Vol. 29, 1-2: 31-36.
107 Abacha’s  successor  restarted  a  process  of  democratic 
transition that led to presidential elections in February 1999 
won by the current president in office, Olusugun Obasanjo.   
The three visits of Panel Inspector Ayensu occurred during 
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instruments108”.  The  demolition  of  homes  and  destruction  of 
properties constituted a massive violation of the rights of victims 
to adequate housing, education, adequate standards of living, se-
curity of person, a healthy environment, food, health, work, re-
spect of dignity inherent in a human being, freedom of move-
ment, family life, water, privacy, information and the right to 
chose one’s own residence.  Specific allegations were made as to 
incidents involving policy brutality and gender discrimination.
The Management response consisted of a factual deni-
al that human rights violations had occurred. There was no ev-
idence of police brutality in the context of the Bank-financed 
project;  no  gender  discrimination  had  occurred;  community 
leaders had not complained of human rights violations; there had 
been regular consultation. In short: “The Bank financed project 
had not violated anybody’s rights”109. On the other hand, Man-
agement conceded that it did not have the resources to observe 
every activity that happened in the course of the project. The re-
sponse repeatedly stressed that many of the alleged violations 
(such as forced evictions by heavily armed police) were unrelat-
ed to Bank-financed activities, and thus the sole responsibility 
of Nigeria: “In any case, the Bank does not have the authority to 
discipline officials of the Lagos State government”110.
The Inspection Panel largely concurred with Management 
on the lack of factual evidence, and considered that many of the 
claims were exaggerated or untrue. The Panel did not recom-
mend a full investigation to the Board. 
Nevertheless, it is of interest that the Inspection Panel did 
not hesitate to review and conclude on the issue of human rights 
violations in connection with the project111. The Panel criticised 
IDA for overly relying on State officials to do the consultation 
with communities, and felt that much closer supervision by IDA 
should have been provided, while recognising the financial con-
straints, and the division of responsibilities as agreed upon in 
the loan agreement. In an obiter dictum the Panel acknowledged 
“the  concerns  and  the  efforts  of  SERAC  for  exhibiting  such 
courage in defending the rights of the affected people during the 
past regime in Nigeria”112. The Panel added that it believed that 
its presence in the equation had made it possible for the request-
ers to develop a better dialogue with IDA staff in the resolution 
of outstanding issues.
SERAC expressed disappointment about the Panel’s deci-
sion. The organisation felt that the Panel over-relied on assuranc-
es given by the Lagos State government and the Bank that evict-
108 See the request for inspection, par.1, as attached to In-
spection Panel, Report and recommendation on request 
for inspection on Nigeria: Lagos drainage and sanitation 
project (6 November 1998).  The request also expressed 
the belief that “the actions and omissions described in the 
present Request are the responsibilities of the Bank be-
cause they have resulted from a project funded by it.  The 
Bank therefore holds a clear legal obligation to ensure that 
the project is implemented in accordance with its own Op-
erational Directives as well as applicable domestic and in-
ternational law.  Being a specialized agency of the Unit-
ed Nations, the Bank is bound by the U.N. Charter which 
recognizes the human rights of every individual” (Ibid., 
par.6). Neither Management, nor the Inspection Panel re-
sponded to the argument. 
109 Management response to claim 23, as attached to In-
spection Panel, Report and recommendation on request 
for inspection on Nigeria: Lagos drainage and sanitation 
project (6 November 1998).
110 Ibid.
111 See  in  particular  Inspection  Panel,  Report  and  rec-
ommendation on request for inspection on Nigeria: La-
gos drainage and sanitation project (6 November 1998), 
par.31:  “On  the  question  of  human  rights  violations  in 
connection with the particular Project, the Panel did not 
find any prima facie evidence that IDA did neglect, fail, 
or refuse to consult with the host communities during the 
development planning and implementation of the Project, 
thus, Management does not appear to have violated appli-
cable IDA Operational Directives”.  On the issue of police 
brutality, see par. 27, 39.  On discrimination, par. 40.  It is 
a matter for speculation what would have happened, had 
the Panel found prima facie evidence of human rights vi-
olations.   In any case, the Panel would have to establish 
that such violations also constituted violations of the rel-
evant Operational Directives; in this case e.g. the Oper-
ational Directives/Policies on Involuntary Resettlement, 
Poverty Reduction and Gender dimensions of develop-
ment.  The language in the policies certainly offers oppor-
tunities for an interpretation allowing to consider relevant 
human rights violations as violations of the operational 
policies as well.  
112 Ibid., par. 45.  The political transition in Nigeria may 
have played a role in the Panel’s recommendation not to 
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ed slum dwellers would be adequately compensated: in fact, 
some  slum  dwellers  were  cajoled  into  accepting  inadequate 
sums.  According to the organisation, the project exacerbated 
the flood damage: “Stagnant waste water now accumulates in 
open drainage channels that were never completed”113.
The handling of the Lagos drainage and sanitation project 
demonstrates the unease of the Bank in dealing with changing 
political circumstances. The Board of Executive Directors’ de-
cision to approve the project after elections day but before the 
final results were made public can be seen as testimony to the 
Bank’s traditional position that political circumstances are irrel-
evant to decisions on loans. The timing of the decision also de-
prived the Bank, however, of a possibility to consider the impact 
of the annulment of the elections on the feasibility of project im-
plementation and monitoring.   
The continued ignorance of the political context by Bank 
staff – as evidenced by their reliance on State officials that were 
part of a political system that had demonstrated with the utmost 
arrogance that it did not value political participation – shows 
a real lack of sensitivity to the component of the project deal-
ing with consultation and protection of persons evicted from the 
area. An argument can be made that the Bank’s attitude in del-
egating consultation to its authoritarian partner amounted to a 
breach of its duty to take care.  
The Panel’s decision not to pursue the investigation ap-
pears to be inspired at least in part by the change in the political 
circumstances: the demise of the Abacha regime and a quick, 
credible transition process to democracy that the international 
community was keen to support. Clearly, the Inspector exhibit-
ed a degree of confidence in the willingness of the new regime 
to treat affected people properly, i.e. to compensate them in ac-
cordance with IDA policies. 
2.4.  Chad-Cameroon: Petroleum and pipeline
  The  Chad-Cameroon  petroleum  and  pipeline 
project involves a huge number of actors. The project is the larg-
est energy infrastructure development on the African content, 
at an estimated total cost of US$ 3.7 billion. It involves the drill-
ing of 300 oil wells in the oil fields of the Doba region of south-
ern Chad and the construction of a 1100 km. long export pipe-
line through Cameroon to an offshore loading facility.
113 See Morka, K. (1999), “When wilful blindness doesn’t 
cut it. Making the case for World Bank accountability to the 
women in Lagos slums”, Access quarterly. Vol.1, 1: 5-10. 
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Approximately 60% of the project cost comes from a Con-
sortium of private actors, consisting of Exxon Mobile (US)(40%), 
Petronas (Malaysia)(35%) and Chevron (US)(25%). The compa-
nies were granted a 30-year concession to develop and operate 
the oil fields. The remainder of the funds was obtained through 
market rate loans arranged through the International Finance 
Corporation; export credit agencies (US and France) and com-
mercial sources [ABN-Amro (The Netherlands) and Credit Ag-
ricole Indosuez (France) are the lead arranging banks]. The Gov-
ernments of Cameroon and Chad have made equity investments 
in the two pipeline operating companies (3% of the project cost), 
that were facilitated by the IBRD (39.5 US million) and the Euro-
pean Investment Bank through the provision of loans.
The World Bank Group contribution to the project also 
includes two initiatives supported by the International Devel-
opment Association: the petroleum sector management capaci-
ty building project (23.7 US million) which aims to build Chad’s 
capacity to manage oil revenues and to use them efficiently for 
poverty reduction; and the management of the petroleum econo-
my project (17.5 US million) to assist the government of Chad in 
building capacity to implement its petroleum revenue manage-
ment strategy.
In  financial  terms  the  contribution  of  the  World  Bank 
group to the project is a minor one, but there is no doubt that its 
commitment was essential, not only in providing funding to the 
governments involved, but particularly in securing the support 
of other external actors. Exxon Mobile viewed the World Bank’s 
involvement as central to reducing the risks of investing in the 
region and stresses the importance of the World Bank’s role in 
advising the Government of Chad on directing oil revenues to 
poverty reduction and on good governance114. The European In-
vestment Bank similarly highlighted the Bank’s efforts to miti-
gate the environmental risks associated with the project, and an-
nounced that it “will continue to work closely with the World 
Bank to ensure this opportunity is properly developed and the 
relevant social and environmental-related conditions are met”115.   
The other project facilitators thus present the Bank’s in-
volvement as a safeguard that the environmental and human con-
sequences of the project will be managed well. In doing so, they 
are also shifting the burden on the Bank, as if to deny any ac-
countability of their own. The Bank, on the other hand, only ac-
cepts accountability for what it has agreed to with the two gov-
ernments, and insists that they bear the primary responsibility.   
The governments in turn can argue they are only partially in 
114 See Gordon, K. (2002), Box 4 at 29.  Consider also the 
following comment: “Due to the commitment of World 
Bank funds, the investment must comply with the Bank’s 
policies (...).  If the policies are genuinely respected, the 
project could mark an important beginning for the estab-
lishment of human rights standards for multinational cor-
porations”: Hernandez Uriz, G. (2001), “ To Lend or not 
to lend: oil, human rights and the World Bank’s inter-
nal contradictions”, Harvard human rights journal, Vol. 
14, Spring 2001, 198. Note that both Exxon Mobile and 
Chevron have adopted human rights policies; see Nord-
skag, M., Ruud, A., “Transnational oil companies and hu-
man rights. What they say and how they say it” in Eide, 
A., Ole Bergesen, H., Rudolfson Goyer, P. (Eds) (2000), 
Human rights and the oil industry. Antwerp: Intersentia, 
146, 149-151.
115 European Investment Bank Press release EXT 2001/018 
(22 June 2001): “EUR 144 million for the Chad-Cameroon 
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control of the project given their dependency on external re-
sources. As in the India: Ecodevelopment example, the result is 
an accountability gap.  
The Board of the World Bank approved the project on 6 
June 2000.  On 22 March 2001, Ngarlejy Yorongar and more 
than 100 residents of the Doba area submitted the request for in-
spection. Mr. Yorongar is a member of parliament from the re-
gion, who was also running as an opposition candidate in Chad’s 
presidential elections, taking place in May 2001. The request al-
leged that the pipeline project constituted a threat to local com-
munities and that proper consultation had not taken place. Af-
ter an on site visit in August, the Inspection Panel recommended 
an investigation on 17 September 2001116. The Board approved 
the investigation on 1 October 2001. After another on site vis-
it, the Panel sent its investigation report to the Board on 17 July 
2002117. On 12 September 2002 the Board recorded its approval 
of the actions and next steps put forth by the Bank Management 
in response to the Panel’s findings118.
Although the Inspection Panel’s review of the project cer-
tainly deserves a more comprehensive analysis119 only two as-
pects of the investigation are dealt with here: first, the impact 
of the overall human rights situation in Chad and secondly, the 
poverty reduction component of the project.
The requesters invoked the rights to life, to a healthy en-
vironment, to fair and equitable compensation, to resettlement 
not far from their native soil, to work, to respect for their cus-
toms and burial places, to social well being, to public consul-
tation120. hey argued that there had not been respect for human 
rights in Chad since President Déby took power and that mas-
sive violations of human rights had occurred in the production 
zone121. Bank Management responded that human rights viola-
tions were only relevant to the Bank’s work “if they may have a 
significant direct economic effect on the project”.  Management 
was of the view that this was not the case here: “The Project can 
achieve its developmental objectives”122.
The  Inspection  Panel  took  “issue  with  Management’s 
narrow view”123 and quoted the paper produced by the Bank at 
the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the Universal Decla-
ration of human rights to stress the Bank’s role in promoting hu-
man rights within the countries in which it operates124. The re-
quester was jailed in 1998 for speaking out against the project, 
and again briefly detained and tortured shortly after the May 
2001 presidential elections, while the request was pending with 
116 Inspection  Panel,  Report  and  recommendation  on  re-
quest for inspection on Chad: Petroleum development and 
pipeline project (17 September 2000).
117 Inspection  Panel,  Investigation  report  on  Chad-Cam-
eroon petroleum and pipeline project (17 July 2002)
118 See  IBRD/IDA  Press  release  (18  September  2002): 
“Chad-Cameroon Pipeline project: outcome of the Inspec-
tion Panel Investigation”.
119 The Inspection Panel found that Management had not 
been in compliance with aspects of a number of Bank pol-
icies,  dealing  with  environmental  assessment,  economic 
evaluation and poverty reduction.
120 The Inspection Panel found that Management had been 
in compliance with operational policies on involuntary re-
settlement and cultural property.
121 See Request for Inspection, par. 3 and 4, as annexed to 
Inspection Panel, Report and recommendation on request 
for inspection on Chad: Petroleum development and pipe-
line project (17 September 2000).
122 Inspection  Panel,  Investigation  report  on  Chad-Cam-
eroon petroleum and pipeline project (17 July 2002), par. 
212.
123 Ibid., par. 214.
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the Inspection Panel125. This background no doubt contributed to 
the Panel’s frustration with Management’s economic effects ap-
proach. Relying explicitly on Amnesty International Annual Re-
ports, the Panel concluded that the human rights situation re-
mained “far from ideal”: “It raises questions about compliance 
with Bank operational policies, in particular those that relate to 
open and informed consultation126, and it warrants renewed mon-
itoring by the Bank”127.
In an unprecedented move, the Bank published the re-
marks made by the Chairman of the Inspection Panel, when he 
presented the investigation report to the Board128. Chairman Ay-
ensu further developed the human rights theme. The Panel was 
convinced that the approach taken in the report “which finds hu-
man rights implicitly embedded in various policies of the Bank” 
was within the boundaries of the Panel’s jurisdiction. He reiter-
ated that the situation in Chad exemplified the need for the Bank 
to be more forthcoming about articulating its promotional role in 
human rights. He also invited the Board to study the wider ram-
ifications of human rights violations as they relate to the overall 
success or failure of policy compliance in future Bank-financed 
projects. 
Public documents provide no evidence of a reply by the 
Board to the Chairman’s call. It is evident however, that the Man-
agement action plan as adopted by the Board in response to the 
Panel investigation does not address the concerns the Panel rais-
es about the effects on the project of the overall human rights sit-
uation in Chad. Consequently, it remains to be seen whether the 
Panel’s findings will have any impact on the conduct of Bank 
staff in the field. 
The poverty reduction component of the project is of par-
ticular relevance from the perspective of economic, social and 
cultural rights. Bank Management insisted that its approach with 
regard to the petroleum revenue Management was to help the 
Government of Chad target the bulk of direct oil revenues from 
the project to expenditures in priority sectors for poverty allevi-
ation129.  
The legal framework to ensure direction of oil revenues 
to poverty reduction is the Act concerning Oil Revenues Man-
agement, approved by Chad’s National Assembly on December 
30, 1998130. The Act provides that the large majority of revenues 
from the project will be spent on priority sectors, identified by 
the law as:
125 The Bank’s President James Wolfensohn personally in-
tervened to obtain the release Mr. Yorongar (See Inspec-
tion Panel, Investigation report on Chad-Cameroon pe-
troleum and pipeline project (17 July 2002), par. 213), by 
calling President Déby.  Reportedly, the World Bank pres-
ident was alerted by an NGO, not by Bank staff. See Hor-
ta, K. (2002), “Rhetoric and reality: human rights and the 
World  Bank”,  Harvard  human  rights  journal.  Vol.  15, 
Spring 2002, 236. 
126 The Inspection Panel noted that in the 1995-1997 peri-
od consultations of local communities had taken place in 
the presence of gendarmes, and found that “consultations 
conducted in the presence of security forces were incom-
patible with the Bank’s policy requirements”. See Inspec-
tion Panel, Investigation report on Chad-Cameroon petro-
leum and pipeline project (17 July 2002), par. 134-135.
127 Ibid., par. 217.
128 IBRD/IDA Press release (18 September 2002): “Chair-
man’s statement on Chad investigation”.
129 See Inspection Panel, Investigation report on Chad-
Cameroon petroleum and pipeline project (17 July 2002), 
par. 267.
130 Act No. 001/PR/99 concerning Oil Revenues Manage-
ment appears as Annex 11 to the Bank’s Project Apprais-
al Document, Report no. 19343 AFR. The Act was report-
edly passed by 108 votes, without opposition. Yorongar 
was in prison at the time. The Parliament passed the Act 
during one three-hour session.  See Hernandez Uriz, G. 
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Public health and social affairs, education, infrastructure, ru-
ral development (agriculture and livestock), environment and water 
resources131.
The Act does not determine the distribution of revenues 
among the sectors, leaving plenty of room for governmental dis-
cretion. 10% of royalties and dividends will be saved “for the 
benefit of future generations”.132 Five percent of the royalties 
will be allocated to “decentralized communities in the produc-
ing region”133. In addition, the Act establishes an Oil Revenues 
Control and Monitoring Board to authorize and monitor the dis-
bursement and appropriation of the relevant funds134.
The Investigation Panel raised various concerns about al-
location of revenues for poverty reduction. First of all, the Pan-
el stated that it had not found any analysis in Bank documents 
justifying the allocation of revenues between Chad and the Oil 
Consortium135, questioning whether the estimated financial re-
turns to Chad could be considered reasonable, given the mag-
nitude of the project. Next, the Panel wondered whether the Oil 
Revenues Management Act had not defined the priority sectors 
too narrowly. The Panel in particular deplored that spending on 
the judiciary and the functioning of the legal system had not 
been included136. More generally, the investigation had revealed 
serious concerns about the failure to develop and strengthen the 
institutional capabilities of the Government of Chad to manage 
the project as a whole, including the capacity to successfully 
translate oil revenues into social objectives137. Consequently, the 
Panel insisted that the operation of the Act be subject of continu-
ing monitoring, review and assessment by an independent body 
“such as the IAG”138.
131 Oil Revenues Management Act, art. 7.
132 Ibid., art. 9.
133 Ibid., art. 8,c. This amount can, however, be changed by 
presidential decree at five-year intervals.  One of the ma-
jor problems of oil exploitation in poor countries has been 
the environmental and human burden on the oil-producing 
regions, while revenues flow towards the capital.  Current 
operational policies of the Bank do not provide standards 
on equitable revenue sharing within countries.
134 Ibid., art. 15-19.  Seven out of the nine members of the 
oversight committee are State officials; the remaining two 
members represent local NGOs and the trade unions.  In 
June  2002,  the  NGO  member  expressed  doubts  about 
whether the Committee would be functioning properly by 
the time first direct oil revenues would be received (2003).   
See Assingar, D., “The Oversight Committee: a phantom 
institution” in Horta, K., Nguiffo, S., Djiraibe, D. (Eds.) 
(2002), The Chad-Cameroon oil and pipeline project: A 
call for accountability. N’ Djamena: Association Tchadi-
enne pour la promotion et la défense des droits de l’homme 
e.a., 9.
135 Inspection Panel, Investigation report on Chad-Cam-
eroon  petroleum  and  pipeline  project  (17  July  2002), 
par.232-236. The relationship between Chad and the Oil 
Consortium is governed by the so-called Convention of 
Establishment, certain provisions of which supersede do-
mestic law.  It has been argued that as a consequence of 
the agreement, the companies involved bear very little, if 
any, legal responsibility for the impact of their activity on 
living conditions. See Breitkopf, S., “The World Bank re-
sponse: PR replaces analysis” in Horta, K., Nguiffo, S., 
Djiraibe, D. (Eds.) (2002), 22-23.
136 Ibid., par. 277. Only the Executive Branch of the gov-
ernment benefits from the revenues.  
137 The first project-related experience was not positive.  In 
2000 the Consortium of private companies paid a ‘bonus’ 
of US$ 25 million to the Chad Government, outside of the 
framework of the Oil Revenues Management Act.  In No-
vember 2000, president Déby disclosed that US$ 4.5 mil-
lion was spent on the acquisition of arms. The arms sale 
preceded the establishment of the International Adviso-
ry Group. Compare e.g. Nguiffo,S., Breitkopf, S. (2001), 
Broken promises.  The Chad Cameroon oil and pipeline 
project; profit at any cost?  Yaounde: CED, Friends of the 
Earth International, 12.
138 Inspection Panel, Investigation report on Chad-Cam-
eroon petroleum and pipeline project (17 July 2002), par. 
279. The World Bank appointed the International Adviso-
ry Group (IAG) on 21 February 2001.  The purpose of the 
IAG is to advise the World Bank and the governments on 
the overall progress in implementation of the project and in 
the achievement of their social, environmental and pover-
ty alleviation objectives.  Specific responsibilities include 
issues such as the misallocation of public revenue, the ad-
equacy of civil society participation and progress in build-
ing institutional capacity.  Human rights are not referred 
to in the terms of reference of the IAG. The powers of the 
IAG are recommendatory only.  The IAG is composed of 
independent experts, and currently chaired by the former 
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The Management Action Plan endorsed by the Board in 
response to the investigation provided for “continuing and in-
tensifying supervision of and assistance for” the Government’s 
capacity -building to direct the oil revenues to poverty reduc-
tion139.
Within the international community it is agreed that coun-
tries with high natural resource endowments need particularly 
strong institutions for public governance140. It is also clear that 
countries with a history of civil strife such as Chad do not have 
such institutions. This puts the World Bank group in the uncom-
fortable position of having “to ensure that systems are in place to 
avoid or mitigate adverse impacts”141, including human rights vi-
olations that may occur in the context of the project. In addition, 
other actors use the Bank’s involvement to deny a responsibility 
of their own.  The Inspection Panel too is limited in its investiga-
tion to the role of the Bank, and is barred from discussing gov-
ernmental or corporate responsibility.  
Lack of governmental capacity may not be the only prob-
lem.  The political will of the Government of Chad to use the oil 
revenues for poverty reduction and to refrain from using repres-
sion against critics of the project remains doubtful.  Clearly, the 
Bank is still deeply ambivalent internally about its role in ensur-
ing respect for human rights and the proper functioning of politi-
cal institutions.  As a consequence of that ambivalence, the Bank 
cannot effectively take up the safeguard role in human rights/
poverty reduction that other actors are happy to entrust it with.   
Instead, the Bank is on the defensive, constantly in doubt on how 
to marry the commitment to its own operational policies with re-
luctance to address or act instead of deficient State institutions.   
In the meantime, the project continues: on a tightrope, and with 
darkness surrounding the safety net.
Group is to visit Cameroon and Chad at least twice a year; 
NGOs had lobbied for a permanent presence.  The critical 
reports of the group can be found on www.gic-iag.org. For 
the terms of reference of the IAG, see World Bank News 
release 2001/235/S (21 February 2001): “World Bank ap-
points  international  advisory  group  on  the  Chad-Cam-
eroon Petroleum development and pipeline project”. 
139 See  IBRD/IDA  Press  release  (18  September  2002): 
“Chad-Cameroon  Pipeline  project:  outcome  of  the  In-
spection Panel Investigation”.
140 Compare Gordon, K. (2002), 13.
141 Inspection Panel, Investigation report on Chad-Cam-
eroon petroleum and pipeline project (17 July 2002), par. 
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  Conclusion
  The  international  financial  institutions  are  sub-
ject to the reach of international human rights law to the extent 
that human rights are incorporated in international custom or in 
general principles of law. The exact substance and scope of the 
human rights obligations of the IFIs needs to be determined in 
the light of the powers and functions entrusted to them.  
It has been argued here that both the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund are under an obligation not to vio-
late or to become complicit in violations of general rules of hu-
man rights law. In addition, the World Bank is under affirmative 
duties to act for the realization of general rules of human rights 
law that are relevant to its purposes and functions. To some ex-
tent those duties are reflected in current World Bank operation-
al policies.  
The adoption of an explicit commitment by the IFIs that 
they will refrain from engaging in activities that contravene ap-
plicable international human rights law would be helpful in end-
ing the debate about the existence of human rights obligations 
for the IFIs. With respect to the Bank, an argument has been 
made that it should insist on the inclusion of human rights claus-
es in loan agreements, and should accept to litigate cases with 
parties that claim that their rights have been violated as a conse-
quence of Bank activity.
The review of selected cases investigated by the World 
Bank Inspection Panel has shown that a human rights accounta-
bility gap may well develop in the context of multi-party devel-
opment projects of the type the Bank typically supports. Such 
an accountability gap can only be addressed if the project facil-
itators conclude detailed agreements on how accountability is 
distributed among them.  
As a public financial institution, it is an appropriate role 
for the Bank to insist that mechanisms for sharing accountabili-
ty are effective in providing human rights protection, both in the 
areas of civil and political rights (consultation mechanisms) and 
economic, social and cultural rights (poverty reduction). Such 
a course of action would be in line with the Bank’s obligations 
under general rules of human rights law. In this respect, there 
is a long way to go. The review of the Inspection Panel cases 
shows that the Bank has great difficulty in coping with the im-
pact of the overall domestic human rights situation on projects 
it supports, and in dealing with governments that are hostile to 
the human rights inspired provisions in the Bank’s own opera-
tional policies. 34 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2002-07 IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2002-07 • 35
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